Abstract-The
I. INTRODUCTION
The Low-rate Denial of Service (LDoS) [1] attack is a new type of DoS attack, which periodically send high intensity pulse data flows to reduce network services capabilities by using the vulnerability of TCP congestion control mechanism. Because of the much lower average attack traffic that it is very difficult to distinguish from the normal traffic, the LDoS attacks are more covert and can't be detected by traditional DoS detection methods.
Currently, some progress has been made in the field of the LDoS detection methods [2, 3] , such as the min-TRO method [1] , the wavelet analysis method [4] , the DTW method [5] , the HAWK method [6] , the Vanguard method [7] , Kai method [8] and so on [9, 10] . For example, the Vanguard method [7] observed the traffic and measured the abnormal traffic, then used three parameters to judge the LDoS attacks. These proposed methods are still some deficiencies as the low accuracy, the high false-negative rate, the high false-positives rate, the weak reliability and so on.
In this paper, we analyze the abnormal frequency distribution and the abnormal fluctuation pattern of the TCP traffic caused by the LDoS attacks. Then we provide a new collaborative detection method (NCDM) for the LDoS attacks. NS2 simulations show that this NCDM has a high accuracy rate, a low false-negative rate and a low false-positives rate. Based on DARPA99 datasets, the experiment results show that the efficiency of this method has improved compared with Vanguard method.
II. MODEL DESCRIPTION
The congestion control mechanism, which is a very important adaptive mechanism of the internet network, has an obvious defect. When the network congests, the congestion control mechanism is triggered. Then the send window and the buffer queue will be rapidly shrink, therefore the service capability of the network has been a sharply decline. The LDoS attacks exploit this flaw and periodically send high intensity pulse data flows, so the network cannot provide normal services. The LDoS attacks usually have three important parameters, as follows. 1) T attack : the cycle of attack. 2) R attack : the intensity of attack pulse. 3) t attack : the duration time of attack. The model of the LDoS attacks and the affection of the system performance under the LDoS attacks are shown in figure 1. Fig. 1(a) depicts the model of the LDoS attacks. Fig. 1(b) shows that the system performance of the network has suffered heavy losses. The influence of the TCP traffic under the LDoS attacks is shown in figure 2. Fig. 2 shows that the LDoS attacks can significantly reduce the average value of TCP traffic. 
III. CHARACTERISTICS ANALYSIS
The LDoS attacks have a deleterious effect on the network traffic, which is quite different from other attacks on the network traffic. According to the issue of this paper, we propose three scenes which may be representative in network, as follows. 1) Scene 1: the normal network without any attacks. 2) Scene 2: network with other attacks such as the DDoS attacks but except the LDoS attacks. 3) Scene 3: network with the LDoS attacks. In order to get the better result of the attacks, the LDoS attacks usually occur in a busy network. So we suppose that each scene has a sufficient number of TCP connections and background data traffic. In order to facilitate analysis the characteristics of the network traffic, in this paper, we analyze the TCP traffic and the other traffic (all the traffic in the network except the TCP traffic are called the other traffic).
Then we define the concept of the Testing Windows as the basic unit to detect the LDoS attacks, as follows.
Definition 1: Within the given length of time
TW
Time , a certain number of consecutive sample values of the network traffic compose a Testing Windows (TW for short).
As the Definition 1, TW is composed of consecutive sample values. With time and traffic as the coordinate axes, the distribution of TCP traffic in the three scenes is shown in figure 3 . Fig. 3 shows that, for the LDoS attacks in Scene 3, the TCP traffic fluctuates acutely, and its distribution is more discrete which has the abnormal changes from Scene 1. For the DDoS attacks in Scene 2, the TCP traffic approaches to zero, and its distribution has the abnormal changes from Scene 1 too, but there abnormal changes are very different from those of Scene 3. Therefore, we can analyze these different phenomena through some statistical characteristics of data traffic, then we can find the abnormal characteristics and detect whether LDoS attacks occur. Fig. 3 shows that the distribution of TCP traffic in the three scenes is quite different. Then the distribution of TCP traffic can be measured by the frequency distribution. The frequency distribution is usually available to analyze the traffic in the three scenes by the Frequency Distribution Histogram. Based the Sturges formula [11] , the group of histogram can be divided equally, then in ascending order of size of the traffic, the frequency of the samples in each group can be counted. The histograms of TCP traffic and other traffic in the three scenes are shown as figure 4 . Fig. 4 shows that, the histogram of TCP traffic in the Scene 1 shifts and forms the shewed histogram, as shown in Fig. 4(a) . As the TCP traffic in Scene 2 have a sharp decline under the attacks, the maximum frequency is located on the first partition of histogram and the other partitions' frequency is close to zero, shown in Fig. 4(b) . The frequency distribution of TCP traffic in Scene 3 is more discrete, and the histogram is much irregular, shown in Fig. 4(c) . Therefore, the histograms of TDF in three scenes show that, the TCP traffic's frequency distribution of the Scene 2 and Scene 3 are different from the Scene 1's, which are called the abnormal frequency distribution of TCP traffic in Scene 2 and Scene 3. Then, for the much longer duration of the high-strength attack flows in Scene 2, the frequency of high flow group in other traffic histogram is much larger, as shown in Fig.  4 (e) that the last partition is large while the other partitions are close to zero. However, the duration of the high-strength attack flows is much shorter and most of the remaining time is full of low flows in Scene 3, therefore the frequency of high flow group is small while the frequency of low flow group is large, as shown in Fig The measures of histogram are usually based on distance, and contrast the similarity of the histogram by a certain algorithm. The higher of the similarity, the nearer distance. Then, by contrasting the similarity of the histogram based on the histogram of Scene 1 and calculating the distance between the other scene and Scene 1, we can judge whether the exception has occurred in the network.
A. The Abnormal Frewuency Distribution Analysis
When the frequency distribution of TCP traffic is abnormal, the attacks may occur in the network. So the Scene 2 or the Scene 3 can be distinguished from the Scene 1 based on the distance of TCP traffic histogram. Then, the distance of other traffic histogram between Scene 2 and Scene 1 is much different from the distance between Scene 3 and Scene 1. So the Scene 2 and the Scene 3 can be distinguished based on the distance of other traffic histogram. A reasonable TU is effective to the accuracy of detecting the LDoS attacks. By analyzing the principles of LDoS attacks, it is convenient to observe the TCP traffic fluctuation pattern and detect the LDoS attacks when the TU is similar to the cycle of LDoS attacks (T attack ).
IV. COLLABORATIVE DETECTION METHOD
As can be seen from the above analysis, the LDoS attacks will cause the abnormal frequency distribution and the abnormal fluctuation pattern of the TCP traffic. In this paper, two kinds of analysis methods are used to collaborative measure these two anomalies. The 
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In a TW, the XD 1 which is expressed as the degree of change of TCP traffic is defined as (4), and the XD 2 which is expressed as the degree of change of TCP traffic caused by the attacks traffic (other traffic) is defined as (5).
In the Scene 1, the occasional burst flows have little effect on the frequency distribution histogram, then XD 1 and XD 2 are both small, indicating that the TCP traffic's frequency distribution and the other traffic's frequency distribution are both normal in this TW. In the Scene 2, the TCP traffic's histogram and the other traffic's histogram have occur significant changes compared with the Scene 1, then XD 1 is large while XD 2 is small, indicating that the TCP traffic's frequency distribution and the other traffic's frequency distribution are both abnormal in this TW. In the Scene 3, only the TCP traffic's histogram has occur significant changes while the other traffic's histogram hasn't occur, then XD 1 and XD 2 are both large, indicating that only the TCP traffic's frequency distribution is abnormal while the other traffic's frequency distribution hasn't occur significant changes in this TW. Those changes are just the abnormal characteristics caused by the LDoS attacks, of which the minute changes of other traffic led to the mutation of TCP traffic. According to the 
B. The MD Measure
The Mean Deviation is the arithmetical average of absolute difference between each sample of all the samples and their mean arithmetical value. The arithmetic is shown in (6). In summary, the abnormal frequency distribution and the abnormal fluctuation pattern of TCP traffic are caused by the LDoS attacks, In order to accurately determine and reduce error, in this paper we stipulate that the LDoS attacks can be confirmed in the TW when there must meet both of the JC1 and JC2.
C. The Steps of Algorithm and Analysis
Based on the above description, we propose a new collaborative detection method for the LDoS attacks are sampled at a sample interval on the key router, and the sampling unit is the number of packets per second.
Obtaining the relevant test parameters. 1 and XD 2 of the training data, we get the XD detection operators 1  and 2  as (7) and (8), where z is a given constant associated with detection accuracy.
2) The MD control factor  and the MD detection operator 3  . Based on MD average () Mean MD and MD variance () Std MD of the training data,  is calculated as (9) , and based on MDT average () Mean MDT and MDT variance () Std MDT of the training data, 3  is calculated as (10) , where z is same as (7).
Detection and judgment the LDoS attacks. By respective calculating the XD 1 , XD 2 , and MDT of test data, based on the corresponding detection operators, we determine whether to meet JC1 and JC2 and detect the LDoS attacks.
In the three steps, based on (1) to (10) , all the formulas are linear, so the space complexity and time complexity are both () ON , where N is the sample values number.
V. EXPERIMENTS
A. Experiment I In order to detect the feasibility and accuracy of this NCDM, we build the experiment system based on NS2 simulator platform. The network topology is shown in figure 6 , where R1, R2 and R3 are routers, and the link between R2 and R3 is the bottleneck link whose bandwidth is 10Mbps and delay is 30ms. All other links are 100Mbps bandwidth and 15ms delay. The network contains 25 TCP connections, in which 10 TCP connections is regarded as the background traffic. All TCP connections use the New Reno congestion control algorithm, and the minimum timeout is 1.0s. The router queue management mechanism is Randomly Early Detection (RED) algorithm. Other network parameters use the default value of the NS2 simulation platform. Simulation time is from 0s to 320s and the background TCP traffic last from 0s to 320s, the LDoS or the DDoS attacks last from 120s to 220s. We design 8 group experiments to test the NCDM.
Experiment group 1 without any attacks in the network is used to validate the false-positives of the Scene 1. Experiment group 2 containing the DDoS attacks (20M attack pulse) is used to validate the accuracy of the Scene 2. From experiments group 3 to experiments group 8 are used to test the accuracy of the Scene 3. The LDoS attacks parameters (T attack , t attack , R attack ) are shown in Table I.   TABLE I. THE EXPERIMENT I SCHEME We set the detection time from 10s to 310s, so we get 15 TWs, where the TW 6 (120s~130s), TW 7~T W 10 and TW 11 (210s~220s) of experiment group 3~8 occur the LDoS attacks. The setting of TW in experiment group 3~8 is shown in figure 7 .
We have got prior 20 groups training data for this network topology, each group training data lasts 3600s and doesn't contain any attacks. TWs of the experiment group 1 don't meet JC1 and JC2; only the TW11 of the experiment group 2 meets JC1 but doesn't meet JC2; and the TW 6~T W 11 of the experiment group 3~8 both meet JC1 and JC2. The detection diagrams of the three scenes which correspond the experiment group 1, 2 and 3 are shown in figure 8 . Therefore we determine that, the experiment group 1 and group 2 don't contain the LDoS attacks, while the TW 6~T W 11 of the experiment group 3~8 contain the LDoS attacks. Experiment results show that the proposed method can accurately and efficiently detect the LDoS attacks. 
B. Experiment II
The experiment II evaluates the false-positive rate of this detection method when the network is normal (the Scene 1) or exist other attacks but except LDoS attacks (the Scene 2). This experiment is based on the MIT Lincoln Laboratory's DARPA99 datasets [12] . In DARPA99 datasets, the data of the first week, the second week and the third week do not contain any attacks, and the data of the fourth week and fifth week contain a lot of attacks except the LDoS attacks. In this experiment the dataset of Tuesday in the first week (inside data, 0s~79000s) is regarded as the training data, and the dataset of Monday in the fifth week (inside data, 0s~79200s) is regarded as the testing data. The dataset of Tuesday in the first week doesn't contain any attacks. 3 9.6%  . We get 317 TWs from testing data, and the detection results of the Experiment II are shown in figure 9 .
As the DARPA99 datasets, the false-positive of this NCDM is also lower than the Vanguard method [7] , as shown in Table III . In the future work, the adaptively of test parameters should be increased, the test parameters should be adjusted adaptively with the subsequent running. So the further discussion on the test parameters is necessary. At the same time, we will further analyze the abnormal characteristics caused by LDoS attacks and extend the judgment criteria to improve the detection accuracy.
